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Two views on the semantics of concrete words are that their core mental representations
are feature-based or are reconstructions of sensory experience. We argue that neither
of these approaches is capable of representing the semantics of abstract words, which
involve the representation of possibly hypothetical physical and mental states, the binding
of entities within a structure, and the possible use of embedding (or recursion) in such
structures. Brain based evidence in the form of dissociations between deficits related
to concrete and abstract semantics corroborates the hypothesis. Neuroimaging evidence
suggests that left lateral inferior frontal cortex supports those processes responsible for
the representation of abstract words.
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INTRODUCTION
Probably the best known theorizing on the organization of the
semantic system within the embodied or grounded cognition
approach is that of Barsalou (2008). While the theory has not
been implemented, it would appear that the systems involved in
the representation and use of abstract concepts, in particular the
perceptual system and those responsible for frames and simula-
tions, are the same as those required for the representation and
use of concrete concepts (but see Adams and Campbell, 1999;
Mitchell and Clement, 1999; Ohlsson, 1999). In this paper we
will discuss neuropsychological and functional imaging evidence
which suggests that the representation of abstract concepts, in
fact, involves a system additional to those involved in the seman-
tic representation of concrete concepts. We will then discuss
what computationally could give rise to this separability between
abstract and concrete words within the functional architecture of
the semantic system.
As far as neuropsychological evidence is concerned, we will
specifically discuss two syndromes—deep dyslexia and the selec-
tive preservation of abstract concepts in the so-called reversed
concreteness effect found in some semantic dementia and herpes
encephalitis patients. The first of these functional syndromes—
deep dyslexia—appears to provide evidence for at least partial
separability of the semantic representations of concrete and
abstract words. The prototypic characteristic of the deep dyslexic
patient, and generally why their reading difficulty was analyzed,
is the making of semantic errors when reading aloud. However,
there are also a variety of other characteristics in their read-
ing that such patients have in common (Coltheart et al., 1987;
Plaut and Shallice, 1993). One is that the patients are much more
able to read aloud words with a concrete, or better an image-
able, meaning than those with an abstract meaning (Shallice and
Warrington, 1975; Coltheart et al., 1987). Face can be read but
not faith. Moreover, for many of these patients the difference
is very large. Thus Shallice (1988) considered the performance
of the first four deep dyslexics whose reading was analyzed in
detail; the smallest difference between the reading of concrete and
abstract words was in patient GR of Marshall and Newcombe
(1966) who read aloud 50% of the former but only 10% of the
latter.
Since it is standardly accepted that the phonological route or
routes for reading are inoperative in these patients, it would seem
straightforward to produce an explanation for their inability to
read abstract words which is based on the assumption that there
are different systems for holding the semantic representations of
abstract and imageable/concrete words. Thus, if one assumes that
there is an at least partial separability between the semantic sys-
tems holding representations of imageable and abstract words,
then it is simple to assume that in this functional syndrome the
latter subsystem is no longer directly accessible from a visual
word-form system, while the former subsystem is. This, indeed,
was the explanation for this aspect of the deep dyslexia functional
syndrome given by Morton and Patterson (1980).
There are, however, two reasons to be cautious about this
interpretation. The first is that the abstract-to-concrete differ-
ence is only one of the many characteristics of deep dyslexia,
and this type of explanation of the functional syndrome as a
whole is not very economical; thus Morton and Patterson (1980)
require five separate functional impairments to explain all aspects
of the functional syndrome. Secondly, it is possible to provide
an explanation of the superiority of concrete over abstract word
reading assuming that exactly the same set of systems are involved
in reading for both types of word, but that the semantic rep-
resentations of abstract words are in some sense quantitatively
weaker than those of concrete words. Thus in the connection-
ist model of Plaut and Shallice (1993), the attractor structure
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leads to an abstract-concrete difference; the reduced number of
features of abstract words by comparison with concrete words
make the processes involved in the reading of abstract words less
able to support a clean-up process than can the richer semantic
representations of concrete words.
A second possible type of explanation, which is also compat-
ible with abstract and concrete words being represented seman-
tically in the same system is given by Newton and Barry (1997).
Deep dyslexia can be present in either an input, central or out-
put form, depending where the impairment lies in the semantic
route for reading, it being assumed that the phonological route or
routes are inoperative (Shallice and Warrington, 1980). Newton
and Barry studied a patient, LW, with an output form of deep
dyslexia—his comprehension of the written word was intact—
but who showed a large effect of concreteness on his ability to
read aloud (highly concrete 48%; abstract 8%). These authors
hold that, when using only the semantic route for reading, the
contrast in performance between concrete and abstract words
in LW could be due to the greater difficulty that the abstract
words produce for the lexicalization process by which an output
phonological word-form or lemma is produced from a semantic
representation. Indeed, Barnard et al. (1982) showed that it was
much easier for normal subjects to name from definition con-
crete words, such as barrel (77% correct), than abstract words,
such as betray (23% correct). Newton and Barry plausibly argue
that concrete words have a higher degree of specificity in the lex-
icalization process than abstract words like idea, for which they
claim “there will be a great deal of spreading activation tomany. . .
related concepts” (p. 502). More generally it has been argued that
accessing abstract and concrete words involves the same semantic
system but that access also requires a network of prior knowledge,
and abstract words are more heavily dependent on this network
(Schwanenflugel, 1991). So loss of access to the network could
give rise to the deep dyslexic pattern of concrete word superiority.
These two examples of explanations of better performance on
concrete than abstract words both depend on concrete words
being higher on some quantitative dimension—number of fea-
tures or degree of specificity—than abstract words. Moreover,
intuitively there are no apparent processes where on a relevant
dimension abstract words would be easier to operate on than
concrete words. There is one model—that of Plaut and Shallice
(1993)—where higher performance on abstract than concrete
words can occur, but this requires a rather specific set of assump-
tions. It is clear that if a much stronger case for the separability
of systems underlying concrete and abstract semantic representa-
tions in the relative preservation of abstract concepts compared
with concrete ones can be found, then an explanation in terms of
their different placings on an underlying continuous dimension
is much more difficult to produce.
THE REVERSED CONCRETENESS EFFECT
The first patient to be described with the reversed concreteness
effect—the better processing of abstract rather than concrete (or
imageable) words—was AB of Warrington (1975). AB was asked
to provide the meaning of a set of abstract and concrete words.
He was rated as producing an appropriate description of the
meanings of 85% of the abstract words but only 24% for the con-
crete ones. Thus he described a pact as “friendly agreement” and
arbiter as “He is a man who tries to arbitrate. Produce a peace-
ful solution.” But to hay and needle, he said he had forgotten
the meaning. AB suffered from what would now be known as
semantic dementia. Later patients showing the reversed concrete-
ness effect have also been described with semantic dementia (see
e.g., Breedin et al., 1994; Cipolotti and Warrington, 1995; Bonner
et al., 2009; Macoir, 2009; Papagno et al., 2009a).
A second aetiology in which the reversed concreteness effect
was obtained is herpes simplex encephalitis. Warrington and
Shallice (1984) described patient SBY who was 94% correct at
giving the meaning of abstract words, but only 50% correct at
giving the meaning of concrete words. Further patients with the
reversed concreteness effect following herpes simplex encephali-
tis have since been described by Sirigu et al. (1991) and Mattioli
(2008).
One critical property of these two aetiologies—semantic
dementia and herpes simplex encephalitis—is that they are both
conditions generally giving rise to so-called semantic degrada-
tion rather than semantic access difficulties, when they affect
the semantic system (see Warrington and Shallice, 1979, 1984;
Warrington and Cipolotti, 1996). In particular, there tends to be
high consistency across sessions in whether or not a patient with
one or other of these two conditions knows the meaning of a word
(Warrington and Shallice, 1984; Warrington and Cipolotti, 1996).
Thus, it is argued that the deficit is of the semantic representations
themselves rather than in accessing or retrieving them.
A second critical property is that both have primary lesion sites
in the anterior temporal lobes. In semantic dementia the critical
lesion site is thought to be in the inferior parts of the anterior
temporal cortex (Mummery et al., 2000; Mion et al., 2010) and
this would be the site of any hypothetical semantic “hub” as on
the theory of Rogers et al. (2004). There are some suggestions
that the critical lesion site is more lateral than medial (e.g., Binney
et al., 2010), but this is less clear in other studies (e.g., Mion et al.,
2010). For the semantic deficits characteristic of herpes simplex
encephalitis, where category specificity within the semantics of
concrete entities is more typical (Capitani et al., 2003), the crit-
ical lesion site is again inferior anterior temporal cortex, but in
this case potentially more medial than lateral (e.g., Tyler et al.,
2004).
The reversed concreteness effect, as discussed so far, has
been demonstrated only in individual patients selected for study
because they show this characteristic. However, recently there
have been criticisms of drawing inferences from individual case
studies to the organization of the normal cognitive system, in par-
ticular with respect to category specificity, of which the reversed
concreteness effects is one example (Laws, 2005; Laws and Sartori,
2005). It is possible that patients showing a reversed concreteness
effect are premorbidly biased, with respect to the average of the
population, in howwell abstract concepts are represented by com-
parison with concrete ones (Hoffman and Lambon Ralph, 2011).
This makes studies using a case series methodology, in which
patients are selected because of their aetiology and not because of
their behavioral characteristics, particularly important (Schwartz
and Dell, 2010; Shallice and Buiatti, 2011). Three research studies
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have been carried out. One study, that of Yi et al. (2007), was only
concerned with the comprehension of verbs, which in general we
will not deal with in this paper. Unfortunately the results of the
other two point in opposite directions.
In the first of the other two studies, Hoffman and Lambon
Ralph (2011) recruited seven patients with a diagnosis of seman-
tic dementia and gave them all seven tests, each of which
compared comprehension of abstract and concrete words. Two
involved only verbs. The other five involved synonym judg-
ments, description-to-word matching, picture-to-word matching
and word-to-related word matching. No patient performed sig-
nificantly better on the abstract words on any test. Three of the
patients performed at a very similar level on the concrete and
abstract words, but three performed significantly better over-
all on the concrete words, if the two verb processing tasks are
included. Hoffman and Lambon Ralph draw the conclusion that
the reversed concreteness effect is an artifact of the selection of
premorbidly atypical patients. There is, however, a major prob-
lem with their study. There is no control group. As discussed
above most people in most tasks find abstract words more dif-
ficult to process than concrete ones. We do not know whether
the pattern of performance shown by the semantic dementia
patients in this case series produced the typical level of dif-
ference between abstract and concrete words that an impaired
general-purpose semantic system would show or whether the rel-
ative difference between the two types of words was in fact less
than that normally found, especially for the three patients who
showed very similar levels of performance between the two types
of word.
By contrast, the study of Loiselle et al. (2012) did have a control
group; in fact it had two. It compared 7 patients having unilat-
eral removals of the anterior temporal cortex with 15 patients
having unilateral removals of the amygdala and the hippocam-
pus and 15 healthy controls. One experimental test given was of
synonym judgments for 50 matched abstract and concrete words.
Z-scores were derived from the performance of the healthy con-
trols. The mean z-score for the anterior temporal patients was
−1.06 for the abstract words but −3.53 for the concrete ones,
significantly worse; by comparison the amygdala-hippocampal
group scores virtually identically across the two types of word:
−2.24 and −2.23, respectively. This supports the position that
systems lying within the anterior temporal cortex are particularly
important for processing the semantics of concrete by compari-
son with abstract words. This implies that the semantic processing
of abstract words is in part dependent on other systems, a posi-
tion originally put forward by Breedin et al. (1994) to explain the
preservation of abstract word comprehension in their semantic
dementia patient. Where might this other system be?
FUNCTIONAL IMAGING STUDIES
Functional imaging research has also led to the proposal that dis-
tinct systems may underlie the representations of abstract and
concrete concepts (Binder et al., 2005). There is an extensive liter-
ature on neuroimaging studies of semantic processing (see Binder
et al., 2009, for review). When processing of abstract words is
contrasted with that of concrete words it tends to produce higher
activation particularly in the left inferior frontal gyrus. Thus in a
meta analysis of Wang et al. (2010), the left inferior frontal region
was much the largest area that was consistently more activated for
abstract than for concrete words.
However, the functional imaging evidence needs to be con-
sidered cautiously for a number of reasons. Firstly, many of the
studies involve tasks, such as lexical decision, which make rel-
atively small demands on semantic processing. This, however,
means that the estimates of areas selectively involved in one or
other type of semantic processing would be conservative. Two
early studies that used lexical decision found somewhat surpris-
ing results. One using PET did find left inferior frontal gyrus to
be more activated for abstract than concrete words (Perani et al.,
1999) but many other regions in the right hemisphere were also
involved. Kiehl et al. (1999) found only a right hemisphere region,
namely the right superior temporal gyrus. However, neither used
a random effects analysis and the Kiehl et al. study only had six
subjects. Two later fMRI studies found effects much more lim-
ited to the left inferior frontal gyrus. In a study of Fiebach and
Friederici (2004) only the left inferior frontal gyrus was involved,
while in that of Binder et al. (2005) a somewhat larger left inferior
frontal gyrus activation spread into the left precentral gyrus and
to a small part of the left superior temporal gyrus.
One recent study did, however, not find any left inferior frontal
gyrus activation when comparing abstract words with concrete
ones, that of Vigliocco et al. (2013). The study was very impres-
sive in that many nuisance variables were controlled between
the abstract and concrete words sets. Altogether 14 variables
were controlled including ones concerned with the orthography
and phonology of the words, age and mode of acquisition, in
addition to familiarity and frequency. However, another variable
that was controlled was imageability. So the abstract word set
included words such as angel, demon, fury, and grief, while the
concrete words included ones like product, relic, estate, and object
(Vigliocco, pers. commun.). Now neuropsychologically, where it
has been examined in deep dyslexia, the key variable differen-
tiating words easy and difficult for the patient to read was not
concreteness (C) but imageability (I) (Shallice and Warrington,
1975). Thus for nouns relatively high in imageability or concrete-
ness, 67% were read correctly by deep dyslexic patient, KF, if for
the word I > C, but only 39% if I < C − 0.5 1. The interpreta-
tion given at the time was that imagery was not itself the critical
process, but whether the meaning of the word had been primarily
learnt from visual experience. This is just the concept that was
later used to explain what had been lost in semantic dementia
patients showing a reversed concreteness effect (Breedin et al.,
1994; Papagno et al., 2009a). Thus the Vigliocco et al. (2013)
results are not relevant if one conceives of as abstract what cannot
be learnt from sensory experience alone.
There is, however, a second problem with respect to the role of
the left inferior frontal gyrus in activation by abstract concepts in
lexical decision. The region is found to be activated in other lexical
decision contrasts, in particular with low frequency words com-
pared with high frequency ones, when concreteness is controlled
(Fiebach et al., 2002). Thus, the region may be involved because
1I and C were as normed by Paivio et al. (1968): compare journal (I = 5.60;
C = 6.69) versus winter (I = 6.53; C = 5.83).
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of other processes, such as subvocalisation, especially as Fiebach
et al. also found that in lexical decision pseudowords activated the
region more than words (see also Fiebach et al., 2007). However,
in the main Fiebach and Friederici (2004) study, reaction times
to abstract and concrete words were virtually identical, so it is
less plausible that additional mediation by subvocal rehearsal is
occurring more for abstract words.
If, however, one moves to more demanding tasks, such as syn-
onym judgments, there is yet another process, in addition to
subvocalisation, which could be involved and which could lead
to activation of left inferior frontal gyrus, namely working mem-
ory maintenance (Petrides, 1994). Intuitively, these two processes
seem more likely to be involved in decisions on abstract words,
as these tend to be the more difficult ones. Yet, when difficulty
was specifically assessed in synonym judgment, it was not found
to be the critical variable in the abstract-concrete contrast. Thus
in the study of Noppeney and Price (2004), difficulty had a much
weaker effect than abstraction per se on activation in the left infe-
rior frontal gyrus. In the study of Sabsevitz et al. (2005) there
was an area of overlap between difficulty and abstraction in left
Brodmann area 45 but there were other parts of the left inferior
frontal gyrus which were just activated by abstract rather than dif-
ficult concepts. Thus both with tasks making small demands on
semantic processing and those making larger ones, the imaging
findings are broadly consistent with the idea that a specific sys-
tem in the left inferior frontal gyrus is involved in compiling the
representations of abstract words.
A left inferior frontal gyrus localization also fits with infer-
ences from other methodologies. The left inferior frontal lobe is
a region which tends to be spared in semantic dementia prior to
the later stages of the disease (Papagno et al., 2009a). Moreover
in the three herpes encephalitis cases referred to above, the lesion
appears not to extend to the left inferior frontal lobe; instead tem-
poral cortices and the limbic system were held to be damaged. In
none of the other cases of reversed concreteness effect reviewed
by Papagno et al. (2009a,b) was the left frontal lobe held to be
involved. A study using rTMS and lexical decision has also been
carried out by Papagno et al. (2009b). They found that lexical
decision to abstract words was less accurate after stimulation of
the left inferior frontal gyrus instead of control sites, while no
such effects were found for concrete words. A similar effect was
also found for the left superior temporal gyrus. Overall, however,
the inferior frontal gyrus appears to be critical for the semantic
processing of abstract words.
CONTRASTING PROPERTIES OF SEMANTIC
REPRESENTATIONS OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS
There is other neuropsychological evidence that the processing of
abstract and concrete words differs qualitatively. This is shown
in two studies of Crutch and Warrington (2005, 2007) on two
patients. One patient, FBI, was a deep dyslexic. The other, AZ,
had a semantic access/refractory disorder (see Warrington and
Shallice, 1979; Warrington and McCarthy, 1987; Warrington and
Cipolotti, 1996). Two types of similarity effects were examined
to see if they differed between concrete and abstract words. The
first was between semantically related members of a superordi-
nate category, such as yacht, dinghy, canoe, ferry, and barge for
concrete words or fury, anger, rage, annoyance, and wrath for
abstract words. The contrasting situation was one in which the
words differ in their superordinate semantic category but are
linked by semantic association such as dagger, blood, ambulance,
policeman, and handcuffs for concrete words or democracy, repub-
lic, freedom, politics, and election for abstract ones. For FBI two
tasks were used: 4 and 5-alternative spoken word to written word
matching and reading aloud the words in these sets. For each of
the two types of word only one of the two kinds of similarity has
a major effect, but it does so for both tasks. However, the other
kind of similarity had little effect. For both tasks the critical effect
for concrete words was belonging to the same category but for
abstract words it was being within a group of associated words.
Analogous findings were obtained with the two patients. This is
evidence that the underlying semantic representations of concrete
words and abstract words differ qualitatively not just quantita-
tively in their structure. Crutch and Ridgway (2012) prefer to
see the semantics of the two types of word as both represented
in a single distributed network. However, to us the contrasting
semantic properties of the two types of word makes it at least
as plausible that their semantic representations involve separa-
ble processing systems with different underlying micro-structure.
To make this more plausible we need to consider how a seman-
tic system or systems for concrete and abstract words might work
computationally.
THE “HUB” AS A POSSIBLE MODEL OF THE SEMANTIC
SYSTEM
In order to consider whether the semantic representations of
abstract and concrete concepts involve the same system or not,
it is necessary to consider how each of them is composed. The
computational model of the semantic system that provides cur-
rently the most plausible account of the semantic representations
of concrete words is the “hub” model in which a central amodal
semantic “hub” has a number of “spokes” representing differ-
ent aspect of the concept (Rogers et al., 2004; Patterson et al.,
2007). In the version of Jefferies and Lambon Ralph (2006) the
spokes are verbal descriptors, visual, auditory, somatasensory and
olfactory/gustatory features and “praxis”. The hub learns to trans-
form input corresponding to one aspect of a concept derived
from one of the spokes to produce an output to a different
spoke, corresponding to another aspect. The concepts and fea-
tures used to train the Rogers et al. net are derived from a study of
Garrard et al. (2001). If we leave on one side superordinate con-
cepts, then the typical more dominant features of the 32 living
thing and 32 artifact concepts Garrard et al. studied are indeed
codeable in representations in one of these spoke systems e.g.,
visual—alligator: has tail, barrel: is made of wood; auditory—
aeroplane: can make a noise, dog: can bark; somatosensory—axe:
is sharp, cat: can scratch; olfactory/gustatory—apple: is sweet,
pineapple: is juicy; praxis—basket: can be filled, bicycle: can be
ridden.
The hub model is not without its internal difficulties. In par-
ticular it is unclear how one form of category specificity—the
superior performance with artifact knowledge compared with liv-
ing thing knowledge quite frequently reported in herpes simplex
encephalitis patients—can occur with very similar lesion sites to
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semantic dementia where such category specificity is very rare
(Garrard et al., 1998; see Lambon Ralph et al., 2007; Shallice and
Cooper, 2011, for discussion). However, we consider it a plausi-
ble model of the semantics of concrete words as it can account
for many striking phenomena with respect to semantic dementia
itself (Patterson et al., 2007).
CONCEPTUAL LIMITATIONS OF THE HUB MODEL WITH
RESPECT TO ABSTRACT WORDS
In the hub model a concrete concept like sparrow is represented
by a list of features: isa bird, is small, has wings, is brown, chirps,
etc. To a non-expert the presence or absence of features are appar-
ently independent of each other; that a sparrow is small, drab and
chirps and a parrot is larger, highly colored and squawks appear to
be just two possibilities in a three dimensional space where any of
eight possibilities are equally likely. But what does a feature mean?
The features listed above have two parts—what one might call an
operator e.g., potential action (can be . . .), and an argument e.g.,
filled or ridden (as in basket: can be filled, or bicycle: can be rid-
den). Thus, within the hub model the content of a concept such
as bicycle may be represented in more formal terms as a conjunc-
tion of features with each feature comprising an operator and an
argument:
Bicycle(X) if and only if isa(X, vehicle) AND (1)
has(X, seat) AND
has(X,wheels) AND
canbe(X, ridden) AND
. . .
In the features given above the operator is specified by the spoke
subsystem so in the case of bicycle: can be ridden it derives from
the spoke system being the praxis one. The set of operators avail-
able is therefore limited by the set of spoke systems and these are
highly restricted in number even if one considers subcategories of
feature; for vision, examples would be the operators has a X or
made of X derived from object-form or texture representations,
respectively. Thus on the hub model a concrete concept has a list
structure of features and the operator part of an individual feature
is specified by the specific spoke that activates the feature.
Consider instead an abstract concept like tendency or hope.
Tendency does have visual or spatial aspects, such as a 10◦
angled line approaching the horizontal, but they are few in num-
ber, far from being distinctive to tendency and cannot without
additional information specify the concept. Hope too has visual
aspects, such as a generally positive expression but they are as
little distinctive to hope as a 10◦ line is to tendency, and dis-
tinctiveness is a key property for learning a concept2. Moreover
2The hub is also linked to “Executive control” in the Jefferies and Lambon
Ralph (2006) version but this is held to “help direct and control semantic
activation in a task-appropriate fashion” (p. 2132). It does not provide compa-
rably functioning input to the other “spoke” systems. Thus few if any features
seem to be located there. In any case, neither tendency nor hope seem to have
executive control aspects.
unlike a concrete concept, their core semantic representation is
not well captured by a list of independent features with access
to the representation requiring that only a subset of the full list
of features be activated. Instead, the concepts tendency, in its
WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998) sense of “a characteristic likelihood
of or natural disposition toward a certain condition or charac-
ter or effect”, and hope, in its WordNet sense of “to intend with
some possibility of fulfilment”, need to be captured by something
equivalent to:
Tendency(X) if and only if 1.0 > probability(X) > chance (2)
Hope(X) if and only if desire(X) AND believe(possible(X)) (3)
For such concepts a much wider set of operators like desire,
believe, and possible, as well as representational abilities related to
probability are required. Even more critically, the logical relations
between the different elements of the whole representation are
much more complex than the simple list structure that, say, the
hubmodel provides. This is both reflected in the recursive embed-
ding of operators (e.g., believe (possible (X))) and by the fact that
the X in (2) and (3) is an event or state of the world, in contrast
to (1) where it corresponds to a physical object. Moreover, in the
former cases the state of the world referred to by X is not the cur-
rent or actual state of the world but a hypothetical, possible state
of the world.
What specific representational abilities might be required for
these concepts? Within the fields of mathematical logic and
formal semantics, providing an account of the meaning of state-
ments such as “it is possible that X” led to the development by
Lewis (see Lewis and Langford, 1932) of so-called “modal log-
ics” (specifically logics of necessity and possibility, and logics
of knowledge and belief) and in particular to the develop-
ment by Kripke (1959) and others of “possible world seman-
tics”. The central idea behind semantic theories of this general
kind is that the meaning of a statement X is determined with
respect to a model or “world”. Modal logics augment tradi-
tional predicate logic with modal operators such as necessary
and possible, or know and believe, while possible world seman-
tics provides a semantic theory in which the meaning of these
operators is provided via the abstract concept of a “possible
world”.
A possible world may be thought of as a set of atomic tokens
and relations between those tokens where the relations are inter-
nally consistent. Thus, if the possible world includes a relation
such as larger-than then this relation must be transitive within
the possible world. Tokens may correspond to concrete objects in
the real world or to abstract entities (such as “a job”). Informally
a possible world can be thought of as similar to a mental model
(Johnson-Laird, 1983) [see in particular, Perner (1988) for discus-
sion of possible world semantics in the representation of mental
states]. Formally, the requirement of internal consistency means
that a possible world is closed with respect to the deductions that
it supports. Thus, if A is true in a world W and A implies B then
B must also be true in W. A statement of the form possible (X)
is true if and only if there exists at least one possible world in
which X is true, while necessary (X) is true if and only if X is
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true in all possible worlds 3. Critically, while the core meaning
of bicycle as in definition (Equation 1) can plausibly be provided
as a set of features or within predicate logic (with a standard so-
called extensional semantics), the meaning of tendency and hope
cannot—additional machinery such as modal logic and possible
world semantics is required4.
We are not suggesting that all abstract words require modal
logic in order to adequately characterize their core meaning,
or that modal logic alone can capture the core meaning of all
abstract words. Rather, the claim is that the meanings of abstract
words cannot be adequately captured purely in terms of a list of
perceptually grounded features, as provided by the hub model.
As a further example, consider democracy, which is defined in
WordNet as “a political system in which the supreme power lies
in a body of citizens who can elect people to represent them”.
This sense of democracy is not readily characterizable either as
a set of perceptually grounded features or as a proposition in
a modal logic. At the very least it is related to concepts of
statehood, government and election in a way that is qualitatively
different from the relation between, for example, bicycle and
wheels.
THE SEPARABLE SYSTEMS APPROACH
In Shallice and Cooper (2011) we argued that differences from
concrete concepts in the computational requirements for how
they are represented in an underlying semantic system, such
as those discussed above, make it plausible that representing
the meanings of abstract concepts involves a different compu-
tational system than that involved in representing the meanings
of concrete concepts. Functionally, this system would need to
incorporate the ability to abstract over events or situations rather
than just individuals, to applymodal operators recursively, and to
allow the representation of hypothetical as well as actual events
or situations. Moreover if we consider how the representation of
an event might be realized computationally, then the binding of
argument roles to arguments is required (see Shastri, 2002); thus
representing an event like the giving of a gift requires filling the
roles of the gift giver, the gift recipient and the gift object.
We should make two qualifications to this position. The first
qualification is that the evidence we have reviewed does not dis-
tinguish between two possibilities. One is that the left inferior
frontal gyrus is the location of the semantic representations of
abstract words. The second is that it is critically involved in
processes necessary to access or construct these representations.
3Possible world semantics normally also includes an “accessibility” relation,
such that possible(X) is true if and only if X is true in some world accessible
from the current world, while necessary(X) is true if and only if X is true in all
worlds accessible from the current world. For simplicitywe ignore this relation
in the current discussion.
4Van Bentham (1976) demonstrated that there is an equivalence between
some modal logics and first-order predicate logic which can be obtained by
mapping a statement P(x) in modal logic to the statement P’(w, x) in first
order logic where w is the current world, and allowing quantification over
possible worlds, so that, for example, possible (P(x)) becomes ∃w P’ (w, x).
While this demonstrates that modal logic per se is not required to provide a
semantics for words such as hope, it does not obviate the need to quantify over
possible worlds or hypothetical states in providing that semantics.
Secondly, we presume that one type of representation of an
event, including binding, can take place in parieto-temporal
systems, namely perceptual representations of the current world
or of a sensory (e.g., visual) image, loosely what at the psycholog-
ical level (with premotor systems) is we assume to be carried by
the concept embodied cognition. However, using Shastri’s exam-
ple, what is represented at this level of processing is person A
handing a concrete object (e.g., a book) to person B. What is not
represented is that the object is a gift, and all the many culturally
dependent implications this has for the giver and the recipient.
Thus even though parieto-temporal systems can capture the rep-
resentation that a particular glittering object is gold (or not as
the case might be!), impairments in understanding the abstract
meaning of a proverb such as all that glitters is not gold—that
appearance does not necessarily correspond to essence—instead
involves prefrontal cortex (Murphy et al., submitted). In par-
ticular, left lateral patients produce more than four times more
concrete interpretations of such proverbs than do healthy con-
trols. It is compatible with their lacking such representations.
For representations at such higher non-perceptual levels, binding
would, we assume, not be available in parietal cortex.
At the very least an abstract concept semantic system would
need the power to implement recursion and argument role filling,
neither of which is, for instance, available in the architecture of
the hub system. We further argued in Shallice and Cooper (2011)
that given requirements such as these, it would be plausible that
the computational microstructure of the region of the human
cortex supporting the representation and processing of abstract
concepts would be different from that of the anterior temporal
cortex held to support the representation of concrete concepts,
and proposed on the basis of functional imaging and patient stud-
ies that this abstract representational system was located in the left
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.
In the psychological literature, the idea that word meaning
involves more than just a list of semantic features is, of course, old.
Indeed, Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) argue that the mean-
ings are represented by mini-programs. Thus they represent the
meaning of LOSE(x, w) by5:
Someone x loses something w if there is a time t such that
Qt(POSSESS(x, w)) and:
(i) Rt(notINTEND(x, notPOSSESS(x, w)))
(ii) HAPPENt(NotPOSSESS(x, w))
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976, p. 568)
The basic difference in our position from this earlier perspec-
tive is that in our view such program-like entities are critical
for representing the meaning of abstract words, but while they
coexist with feature-based ones, they are in a functionally and
anatomically separable system.
5Qt and Rt are operators within a temporal modal logic.Qt (P) is true if P was
true prior to time t and Rt(P) is true if P is true at time t. Qt might be glossed
as “it was the case that. . .” and Rt as “it is the case that. . .”.
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The role that we have assigned to the left inferior frontal
gyrus has another if slightly more indirect precursor. The
computational machinery which we have proposed for this region
with respect to the compiling of the meaning of abstract words
has many similarities to that presupposed for compiling syntax.
In particular our position on abstract words, too, requires that
unification links be made between the arguments of two or more
operators, as in the example of hope above (see, e.g., Pollard and
Sag, 1987, 1994, for unification in syntactic operations). Hagoort
(2003), too, has argued that the left inferior frontal gyrus con-
tains the necessary computational machinery for implementing
unification processes. In his account chunks of syntactic structure
(e.g., S, NP, VP, N, and V) of an utterance are stored in mem-
ory. In a unification workspace the feet of one syntactic chunk
are potentially linked to the root of another. In the computational
model of Vosse and Kempen (2000), which he adopts, rival sets of
unification links for spanning a whole utterance (e.g., a sentence)
compete by lateral inhibition until one reaches threshold. In
Hagoort’s account this process of forming provisional sets of links
which compete by lateral inhibition takes place in the left inferior
frontal gyrus. In later papers (e.g., Hagoort, 2005) he extends this
idea to consider semantics, with semantic unification being held
to take place in a region a little more inferior and anterior than
that for syntactic unification. The form of semantic unification
he considers is the integration of word meaning into an unfold-
ing discourse representation of the preceding context, for instance
in the selection of the appropriate meaning of a homonym. Our
proposal is that an analogous process may underlie the semantic
representations of individual abstract words.
Of course it may be argued that unification as a concept is
little more than binding which is widely postulated to occur in
many cognitive processes, as in episodic memory encoding in
the hippocampus (Marr, 1971; Gardner-Medwin, 1976) or per-
ceptual feature-binding in parietal cortex (Treisman, 1998). The
critical formal difference between unification and binding is that
the former combines multiple potentially overlapping sources of
information. Unification will fail if overlapping elements of the
to-be-combined representations are inconsistent. Moreover unifi-
cation is typically used in building complex structures (e.g., where
multiple arguments serve different functional roles) out of parts,
and where the parts place constraints on each other. Thus what
we assume distinguishes the unification process taking place in
left inferior frontal cortex is that the item or element is being
bound to a node within a more complex structure representing
an abstract general property such as propositional phrase or type
of mental state.
How does this position relate to the cognitive neuroscience
evidence just discussed? If the computational properties of an
abstract concept semantic system were designed in part to allow
events to be represented, Crutch and Warrington’s findings that
associations are critical in the representations of abstract words
would seem to follow. A set of words like gamble, casino, poker, and
chance, ones used in Crutch and Warrington’s (2005) experiment
on interference from associated sets, almost inevitably creates a
characteristic situation or set of events related to playing poker,
as does the example democracy, republic, freedom, politics, and
election discussed earlier, redolent of the 2012 American election;
so the individual abstract semantic representations would be
linked to each other through it.
A second phenomenon which has been held to support the
idea that the semantics of abstract words can be represented in the
hub and hence to present difficulties for an abstract semantic sys-
tem account comes from a rTMS study of Hoffman et al. (2010).
They followed Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1983) in assuming
that the same semantic system is involved for abstract and con-
crete words but the precise meaning of an abstract concept is
heavily dependent on context. (It is not clear whether or how
this would apply to concepts like neutron or checkmate.) They
gave subjects a 3-alternative synonym judgment task together
with a target word presented altogether at the same time or also
preceded for 6 s by a 2-sentence context. Without the context,
slower responding to abstract words occurred with rTMS to left
Brodmann area 45 than without it. However, with context no such
effect occurred. With concrete words, rTMS has no effect in either
case.
Hoffman et al. (2010) explain their result as occurring through
left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex having an executive regula-
tion role with respect to the processing of abstract words, and
this becomes less necessary when context is provided. It is not,
though, clear, what computational function executive regulation
plays in understanding an abstract word in a context-free situa-
tion. Moreover there are possible alternative explanations of the
result. rTMS does not lead to any increase in errors with abstract
words, it just leads to slowing in the no-context condition. Thus
in the context situation the subject will have already understood
the word, which has already been presented in the context, at least
in the example given, so the subject will just have to comprehend
one critical word instead of two, and so at worst will presum-
ably be slowed up only half as much. As the no-context effect
was only just significant at the 0.05 level one would not therefore
predict a significant effect in the context case even if the left ven-
trolateral PFC was as critical there. Moreover, even if full abstract
comprehension of the three choice words is slowed, the 6 s of con-
text presentation will have left a rich set of concrete images from
parieto-temporal regions available to facilitate the choice between
the three alternatives, at least on some trials, so this again would
be expected to reduce any effect in the context condition com-
pared to the no-context one. The study, by itself does not resolve
the issue.
CONCLUSIONS
Our primary conclusion is a negative one. It is that the com-
putational capacities provided by embodied cognition, on the
one hand, and the feature-based representation of semantics on
other hand (and more specifically the “hub” system), are insuffi-
ciently powerful to adequately capture the semantics of abstract
concepts. Moreover we have argued that patients with reversed
concreteness effects on the one hand and deep dyslexia on the
other provide some evidence that the semantic representations
of abstract and concrete words are at least partially separable
in the cognitive system. This position is further supported by
the different patterns of interference and facilitation found by
Crutch andWarrington in their single case studies. Neuroimaging
evidence, too, suggests that the left inferior frontal cortex plays a
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more important role in the compiling of the semantics of abstract
than concrete words.
The computational characteristics that we have ascribed to an
abstract representational system have a very similar conceptual
basis to—but are different from—those involved in grammat-
ical/syntactic operations in language. If the microstructure of
cortex is critical for the computational properties of the func-
tional systems it supports, then it is plausible that systems with
similar computational requirements are supported by overlap-
ping or adjacent regions of cortex. It is therefore not surprising
that a similar region of cortex would be involved in the repre-
sentation of abstract concepts to that damaged in agrammatism
(e.g., Tyler et al., 2005, 2010, 2011). Moreover deduction, which
also requires similar computational properties in the construction
of abstract structures in premise integration, also involves a very
similar region (Reverberi et al., 2012). Two qualifications should
bemade. The first is that the operational definitions of abstraction
used in empirical studies have typically been made apophatically
or negatively, by the absence of concreteness in the entity, or
as we have argued neuropsychologically more appropriately, the
absence of imageability of the concept. Ideally on our approach,
one ought to be able to produce an operationalization of abstrac-
tion which is positive rather than negative. Until this is done,
direct empirical support for a position such as ours will be
difficult to obtain.
The second qualification relates to the way that the general
thrust of this paper may be interpreted as suggesting that repre-
sentations of abstract concepts are held in the left inferior frontal
gyrus. Moreover, the link we have made between our approach
and Hagoort’s unification concept tends to reinforce that view.
However, the direct empirical cognitive neuroscience evidence
is open to a second interpretation. This is that the represen-
tations of abstract concepts are carried in a more distributed
fashion, possibly more generally in prefrontal cortex. In this case
the left inferior frontal region would be crucial in performing
appropriate computations to compile the more distributed rep-
resentations. Which of these two possibilities is to be preferred
empirically remains in our view an open question. In either
case, though, there would be more to the mind than embodied
cognition.
REFERENCES
Adams, F., and Campbell, K.
(1999). Modality and abstract
concepts. Behav. Brain Sci. 22,
610–610.
Barnard, P. J., Hammond, N. V.,
MacLean, A., and Morton, J. (1982).
Learning and remembering inter-
active commands in a text edit-
ing task. Behav. Inform. Technol. 1,
347–358.
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded
cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59,
617–645.
Binder, J. R., Westbury, C. F.,
McKiernan, K. A., Possing, E.
T., and Medlar, D. A. (2005).
Distinct brain systems for process-
ing concrete and abstract concepts.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 905–917.
Binder, J. R., Desai, R. H., Graves, W.
W., and Conant, L. L. (2009). Where
is the semantic system? A criti-
cal review of 120 functional neu-
roimaging studies. Cereb. Cortex 19,
2767–2796.
Binney, R. J., Embleton, K. V., Jefferies,
E., Parker, G. J., and Ralph, M. A.
L. (2010). The ventral and infero-
lateral aspects of the anterior tem-
poral lobe are crucial in seman-
tic memory: evidence from a novel
direct comparison of distortion-
corrected fMRI, rTMS, and seman-
tic dementia. Cereb. Cortex 20,
2728–2738.
Bonner, M. F., Vesely, L., Price, C.,
Anderson, C., Richmond, L., Farag,
C., et al. (2009). Reversal of the
concreteness effect in semantic
dementia. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 26,
568–579.
Breedin, S. D., Saffran, E. M., and
Coslett, H. B. (1994). Reversal
of the concreteness effect in a
patient with semantic dementia.
Cogn. Neuropsychol. 11, 617–660.
Capitani, E., Laiacona, M., Mahon,
B., and Caramazza, A. (2003).
What are the facts of semantic
category-specific deficits? A critical
review of the clinical evidence.
Cogn. Neuropsychol. 20, 213–261.
Cipolotti, L., and Warrington, E.
K. (1995). Semantic memory
and reading abilities: a case
report. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc. 1,
104–110.
Coltheart, M., Patterson, K., and
Marshall, J. C. (1987). “Deep
dyslexia since 1980,” in Deep
Dyslexia, eds M. Coltheart, K.
Patterson, and J. C. Marshall
(London, UK: Routledge), 407–451.
Crutch, S. J., and Ridgway, G. R.
(2012). On the semantic elements
of abstract words. Cortex 48,
1376–1378.
Crutch, S. J., and Warrington, E.
K. (2005). Abstract and concrete
concepts have structurally different
representational frameworks. Brain
128, 615–627.
Crutch, S. J., and Warrington, E.
K. (2007). Contrasting effects of
semantic priming and interfer-
ence in processing abstract and
concrete words. Brain Lang. 103,
88–89.
Fellbaum, C. (ed.). (1998). WordNet:
An Electronic Lexical Database.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Fiebach, C. J., Friederici, A. D., Müller,
K., and Von Cramon, D. Y. (2002).
fMRI evidence for dual routes to
the mental lexicon in visual word
recognition. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14,
11–23.
Fiebach, C. J., and Friederici, A.
D. (2004). Processing concrete
words: fMRI evidence against
a specific right-hemisphere
involvement. Neuropsychologia 42,
62–70.
Fiebach, C. J., Ricker, B., Friederici,
A. D., and Jacobs, A. M. (2007).
Inhibition and facilitation in visual
word recognition: prefrontal contri-
bution to the orthographic neigh-
borhood size effect. Neuroimage 36,
901–911.
Gardner-Medwin, A. R. (1976). The
recall of events through the learning
of associations between their parts.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 194,
375–402.
Garrard, P., Patterson, K., Watson,
P. C., and Hodges, J. R. (1998).
Category specific semantic loss
in dementia of Alzheimer’s type.
Functional-anatomical correlations
from cross-sectional analyses. Brain
121, 633–646.
Garrard, P., Lambon Ralph, M. A.,
Hodges, J. R., and Patterson, K.
(2001). Prototypicality, distinc-
tiveness, and intercorrelation:
analyses of the semantic attributes
of living and nonliving con-
cepts. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 18,
125–174.
Hagoort, P. (2003). How the brain
solves the binding problem for lan-
guage: a neurocomputational model
of syntactic processing. Neuroimage
20, S18–S29.
Hagoort, P. (2005). On Broca, brain,
and binding: a new framework.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 416–423.
Hoffman, P., Jefferies, E., and Lambon
Ralph, M. A. (2010). Ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex plays an executive
regulation role in comprehension
of abstract words: convergent
neuropsychological and repetitive
TMS evidence. J. Neurosci. 30,
15450–15456.
Hoffman, P., and Lambon Ralph, M. A.
(2011). Reverse concreteness effects
are not a typical feature of seman-
tic dementia: evidence for the hub-
and-spoke model of conceptual
representation. Cereb. Cortex 21,
2103–2112.
Jefferies, E., and Lambon Ralph, M.
A. (2006). Semantic impairment
in stroke aphasia versus semantic
dementia: a case-series comparison.
Brain 129, 2132–2147.
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental
Models. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Kiehl, K. A., Liddle, P. F., Smith, A.
M., Mendrek, A., Forster, B. B., and
Hare, R. D. (1999). Neural path-
ways involved in the processing of
concrete and abstract words. Hum.
Brain Mapp. 7, 225–233.
Kripke, S. A. (1959). A completeness
theorem in modal logic. J. Symbolic
Logic 24, 1–14.
Lambon Ralph, M. A., Lowe, C., and
Rogers, T. T. (2007). Neural basis of
category-specific semantic deficits
for living things: evidence from
semantic dementia, HSVE and a
neural network model. Brain 130,
1127–1137.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 175 | 8
Shallice and Cooper Semantics of abstract words
Laws, K. R. (2005). Illusions of nor-
mality: a methodological critique
of category-specific naming. Cortex
41, 842–851.
Laws, K. R., and Sartori, G. (2005).
Category deficits and paradoxical
dissociations in Alzheimer’s disease
and herpes simplex encephalitis.
J. CognitiveNeurosci. 17, 1453–1459.
Lewis, C. I., and Langford, C. H.
(1932). Symbolic Logic, New York,
NY: Century Company.
Loiselle, M., Rouleau, I., Nguyen,
D. K., Dubeau, F., Macoir, J.,
Whatmough, C., et al. (2012).
Comprehension of concrete and
abstract words in patients with
selective anterior temporal lobe
resection and in patients with selec-
tive amygdalo-hippocampectomy.
Neuropsychologia 50, 630–639.
Macoir, J. (2009). Is a plum a mem-
ory problem? Longitudinal study
of the reversal of concreteness
effect in a patient with semantic
dementia. Neuropsychologia 47,
518–535.
Marr, D. (1971). Simplememory: a the-
ory for archicortex. Phil. Trans. R.
Soc. Lond. B 262, 23–81.
Marshall, J. C., and Newcombe,
F. (1966). Syntactic and
semantic errors in paralexia.
Neuropsychologia 4, 169–176.
Mattioli, F. (2008). “The reverse
of the concreteness effect,” in
Talks Presented at the 46th Annual
Conference of the Academy of
Aphasia (Turku, Finland), 19–21.
Miller, G. A. and Johnson-Laird, P.
N. (1976). Language and Perception.
Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University
Press.
Mion, M., Patterson, K., Acosta-
Cabronero, J., Pengas, G.,
Izquierdo-Garcia, D., Hong, Y.
T., et al. (2010). What the left and
right anterior fusiform gyri tell us
about semantic memory. Brain 133,
3256–3268.
Mitchell, R. W., and Clement, C. A.
(1999). Simulations, simulators,
amodality, and abstract terms.
Behav. Brain Sci. 22, 628–629.
Morton, J., and Patterson, K. (1980).
“A new attempt at an interpretation,
or, an attempt at a new interpre-
tation,” in Deep Dyslexia, eds M.
Coltheart, K. Patterson, and J. C.
Marshall (London, UK: Routledge),
91–118.
Mummery, C. J., Patterson, K., Price,
C. J., Ashburner, J., Frackowiak, R.
S. J., and Hodges, J. R. (2000).
A voxel-based morphometry study
of semantic dementia: relationship
between temporal lobe atrophy and
semantic memory. Ann. Neurol. 47,
36–45.
Newton, P. K., and Barry, C. (1997).
Concreteness effects in word pro-
duction but not word compre-
hension in deep dyslexia. Cogn.
Neuropsychol. 14, 481–509.
Noppeney, U., and Price, C. J. (2004).
Retrieval of abstract semantics.
Neuroimage 22, 164–170.
Ohlsson, S. (1999). Selecting is not
abstracting. Behav. Brain Sci. 22,
630–631.
Papagno, C., Capasso, R., and
Miceli, G. (2009a). Reversed
concreteness effect for nouns in a
subject with semantic dementia.
Neuropsychologia 47, 1138–1148.
Papagno, C., Fogliata, A., Catrical,
E., and Miniussi, C. (2009b). The
lexical processing of abstract and
concrete nouns. Brain Res. 1263,
78–86.
Patterson, K., Nestor, P. J., and Rogers,
T. T. (2007). Where do you know
what you know? The representa-
tion of semantic knowledge in the
human brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 8,
976–987.
Paivio, A., Yuille, J. C., and Madigan,
J. A. (1968). Concreteness, imagery
and meaningfulness values for
925 nouns. J. Exp. Psychol.
76, 1–25.
Perani, D., Cappa, S. F., Schnur, T.,
Tettamanti, M., Collina, S., Rosa,
M. M., et al. (1999). The neural
correlates of verb and noun pro-
cessing: a PET study. Brain 122,
2337–2344.
Perner, J. (1988). “Developing seman-
tics for theories of mind: from
propositional attitudes to mental
representation,” in Developing
Theories of Mind, eds J. W.
Astington, P. L. Harris, and
D. R. Olson (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press),
141–172.
Petrides, M. (1994). “Frontal lobes
and working memory: evidence
from investigations of the effects
of cortical excisions in nonhu-
man primates,” in Handbook of
Neuropsychology. Vol. 9, eds. F.
Boller and J. Grafman (Amsterdam:
Elsevier), 59–82.
Plaut, D. C., and Shallice, T. (1993).
Deep dyslexia: a case study of
connectionist neuropsychol-
ogy. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 10,
377–500.
Pollard, C., and Sag, I. A. (1987).
Information-based Syntax and
Semantics. Vol. 1, Fundamentals.
Palo Alto, Ca: Center for the Study
of Language and Information.
Pollard, C., and Sag, I. A. (1994).Head-
driven Phrase Structure Grammar.
Chicago, Il: University of Chicago
Press.
Reverberi, C., Bonatti, L. L.,
Frackowiak, R. S., Paulesu, E.,
Cherubini, P., and Macaluso,
E. (2012). Large scale brain
activations predict reason-
ing profiles. Neuroimage 59,
1752–1764.
Rogers, T. T., Lambon Ralph, M. A.,
Garrard, P., Bozeat, S., McClelland,
J. L., Hodges, J. R., et al. (2004).
Structure and deterioration of
semantic memory: a neuropsy-
chological and computational
investigation. Psychol. Rev. 111, 205.
Sabsevitz, D. S., Medler, D. A.,
Seidenberg, M., and Binder, J. R.
(2005). Modulation of the seman-
tic system by word imageability.
Neuroimage 27, 188–200.
Schwanenflugel, P. (1991). “Why are
abstract concepts hard to under-
stand?” in The Psychology of Word
Meanings, ed P. Schwanenflugel
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates), 223–250.
Schwanenflugel, P. J., and Shoben,
E. J. (1983). Differential context
effects in the comprehension of
abstract and concrete verbal mate-
rials. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. 9,
82–102.
Schwartz, M. F., and Dell, G. S.
(2010). Case series investigations
in cognitive neuropsychology. Cogn.
Neuropsychol. 27, 477–494.
Shallice, T. (1988). From
Neuropsychology to Mental
Structure. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Shallice, T., and Buiatti, T. (2011).
Types of case series—the anatom-
ically based approach: commen-
tary on MF Schwartz and GS
dell: case series investigations in
cognitive neuropsychology. Cogn.
Neuropsychol. 28, 500–514.
Shallice, T., and Cooper, R. (2011). The
Organisation of Mind. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Shallice, T., and Warrington, E. K.
(1975). Word recognition in a
phonemic dyslexic patient. Q. J.
Exp. Psychol. 27, 187–199.
Shallice, T., and Warrington, E. K.
(1980). “Single and multiple
component central dyslexic syn-
dromes,” in Deep Dyslexia, eds M.
Coltheart, K. Patterson, and J. C.
Marshall (London, UK: Routledge),
251–257.
Shastri, L. (2002). Episodic mem-
ory and corticohippocampal
interactions. Trends Cogn. Sci. 6,
162–168.
Sirigu, A., Duhamel, J. R., and Poncet,
M. (1991). The role of sensorimotor
experience in object recognition: a
case of multimodal agnosia. Brain
114, 2555–2573.
Treisman, A. (1998). Feature bind-
ing, attention and object perception.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 353,
1295–1306.
Tyler, L. K., Stamatakis, E. A., Bright,
P., Acres, K., Abdallah, S., Rodd,
J. M., et al. (2004). Processing
objects at different levels of
specificity. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16,
351–362.
Tyler, L. K., Marslen-Wilson, W. D.,
and Stamatakis, E. A. (2005).
Differentiating lexical form,
meaning, and structure in the
neural language system. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 102,
8375–8380.
Tyler, L. K., Wright, P., Randall,
B., Marslen-Wilson, W. D.,
and Stamatakis, E. A. (2010).
Reorganization of syntactic process-
ing following left-hemisphere brain
damage: does right-hemisphere
activity preserve function? Brain
133, 3396–3408.
Tyler, L. K., Marslen-Wilson, W. D.,
Randall, B., Wright, P., Devereux,
B. J., Zhuang, J., et al. (2011).
Left inferior frontal cortex and
syntax: function, structure and
behaviour in patients with left
hemisphere damage. Brain 134,
415–431.
Van Bentham, J. (1976). Modal
Correspondence Theory. Ph.D.
Dissertation, Mathematical
Institute, University of Amsterdam.
Vigliocco, G., Kousta, S., Vinson,
D., Andrews, M., and Del
Campo, E. (2013). The rep-
resentation of abstract words:
what matters? Reply to Paivio’s
(2013) comment on Kousta et al.
(2011). J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 142,
288–291.
Vosse, T., and Kempen, G. (2000).
Syntactic structure assembly
in human parsing: a com-
putational model based on
competitive inhibition and a
lexicalist grammar. Cognition 75,
105–143.
Wang, J., Conder, J. A., Blitzer, D. N.,
and Shinkareva, S. V. (2010). Neural
representations of abstract and con-
crete concepts: a meta-analysis of
imaging studies. Hum. Brain Mapp.
31, 1459–1468.
Warrington, E. K. (1975). The selec-
tive impairment of semantic
memory. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 27,
635–657.
Warrington, E. K., and Cipolotti, L.
(1996). Word comprehension: the
distinction between refractory and
storage impairments. Brain 119,
611–625.
Warrington, E. K., and McCarthy, R.
A. (1987). Categories of knowledge
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 175 | 9
Shallice and Cooper Semantics of abstract words
further fractionations and an
attempted integration. Brain 110,
1273–1296.
Warrington, E. K., and Shallice, T.
(1979). Semantic access dyslexia.
Brain 102, 43–63.
Warrington, E. K., and Shallice,
T. (1984). Category specific
semantic impairments. Brain 107,
829–853.
Yi, H. A., Moore, P., and Grossman,
M. (2007). Reversal of the con-
creteness effect for verbs in
patients with semantic demen-
tia. Neuropsychology 21, 9–19.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 26 November 2012; accepted:
18 April 2013; published online: 08 May
2013.
Citation: Shallice T and Cooper RP
(2013) Is there a semantic system for
abstract words? Front. Hum. Neurosci.
7:175. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00175
Copyright © 2013 Shallice and
Cooper. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in other forums, provided
the original authors and source are
credited and subject to any copyright
notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 175 | 10
